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Abstract. In May 2015, voters in seven Italian regions went to the polls to elect new regional 
councils and governments. The final election result was apparently similar to that of 2010: 
centre-left coalitions won in five out of seven regions, like in the previous election, leaving 
the remaining two to the centre-right. Yet behind this picture of stability, dramatic changes 
have occurred in the internal composition of regional coalitions, cross-party equilibriums 
and levels of participation. Generally, regional party-based democracy seems to be 
experiencing increasing fragmentation and a crisis of representation and legitimacy.  
Keywords: Italy, Regional Election, Party Politics, Electoral Participation, Sub-national 
Democracy 
Introduction 
Until 2010 regional elections had always been held on the same day in all, or almost all, 
‘ordinary status’1 Italian regions. Yet on the 31st May 2015, for the first time, only seven of 
fifteen regions went to the polls since the remaining ones had to call early elections in 
previous years after their governments collapsed. This demonstrates the increasing 
fragmentation of Italian sub-national democracy, which, as shown below, is experiencing a 
period of crisis and deep transformations. Indeed, levels of electoral participation have 
collapsed in all the seven regions considered here and their political landscapes have also 
changed dramatically. 
This paper is divided into two main parts. The first part consists of three sections, 
which describe the cross-regional differentiation in electoral systems, the main political 
actors involved and the declining legitimacy of regional institutions.  The second part is 
equally formed of three sections that focus on election outcomes. First, long-term trends in 
electoral participation are assessed. Secondly, percentages obtained by individual lists are 
analysed and it is shown that mainstream parties have lost many votes to local lists, with 
electoral volatility reaching its highest point in twenty years. The third section of this part 
considers the composition of regional councils and, by looking at levels of fragmentation 
                                                          
1 Fifteen Italian regions are defined as ‘ordinary status’ and they have less fiscal and policy-making 
autonomy than the remaining five ‘special status’ regions. 
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and disproportionality, suggests that it is difficult to detect common patterns of 
representative democracy across the regions analysed. 
 
 
Part 1 
Seven regions, seven voting systems 
As underlined by Pallarés and Keating (2003: 244) in their analysis of multi-level electoral 
competition in Spain, ‘the electoral system helps to explain the specific pattern of party 
systems and also the relationships between territorial levels’. Italy is the only case among 
European decentralised systems in which regions have been free to adopt significantly 
different voting systems (Floridia, 2005). Not only do the regional voting systems diverge 
from the national one but they also substantially differ from each other. This has led to 
cross-regional fragmentation in the mechanisms that translate votes into political 
representation. Table 1 presents a summary of the different voting systems in place in the 
seven regions analysed in this paper. As it can be seen, although they have all adopted  
proportional voting systems, which also allow for the formation of multi-party coalitions, 
regional electoral laws have established different thresholds for individual parties and 
coalitions of parties. Additionally, winning coalitions are granted majority bonuses that vary 
in magnitude from region to region, also depending on the percentage of votes obtained by 
the winning coalition. Tuscany is also the only case in which a two-round electoral system, if 
no candidate for president obtains at least 40% of the vote, has been introduced. In sum, the 
institutional rules that shape regional party competition are extremely fragmented and, 
often, very complicated.  
The only common feature is that regional presidents are all directly elected. 
Therefore, whereas at the national level Italy can still be classified as a parliamentary 
democracy (Lijphart, 1992), regional systems are moving closer to the presidential model. 
This has led to a more general process of ‘presidentialisation’ of regional politics (Poguntke 
and Webb, 2005), which, in turn, has had an impact on the quality of the political offer, with 
the sharp increase in the number of ‘personal’ local lists supporting the candidates for 
regional presidency.  
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[Table 1 about here] 
 
 
Parties, programmes, coalitions and the rise of ‘local lists’ 
 
The 2015 election was an important political test in a context of deep transformations in the 
Italian party system. The section provides a brief overview of the programmatic and 
coalition strategies pursued by the four largest parties competing in the election.2  
The Democratic Party (PD) is a centre-left party and the main party in central 
government. Its young leader and Italian Prime Minister, Matteo Renzi, has started a process 
of radical economic and social reforms, which have been strongly criticized by the more 
traditional factions of his own party. In 2014, Renzi transformed the European election 
campaign into a sort of referendum on his government, which had been formed only three 
months before. The PD achieved its best result ever obtaining around 40% of the vote 
(Valbruzzi and Vignati, 2014). On the occasion of the 2015 regional election, however, Renzi 
played a much less active role in the candidate selection and in the electoral campaign. In 
five out of seven regions, supporters and members were given the opportunity to participate 
in open primaries to select the candidates for the presidency. Also in terms of programmatic 
platforms, the PD did not adopt a homogeneous strategy across the seven regions. In 
Tuscany, for instance, the regional party branch presented a traditional manifesto that also 
referred to the actions taken by the party leadership in central government. In Apulia the 
party organisation played a marginal role in the construction of the platform, which was 
instead a bottom-up process of deliberation open to the local population, completely focused 
on regional issues and directly promoted by the candidate for regional presidency without 
party mediation. In Veneto, the PD candidate did not even present a complete programme 
but, instead, relied on a list of very short slogans.  
Over the last two years, the Northern League (LN) has transformed from a purely 
regionalist party into a right-wing, populist party with state-wide political aspirations. 
                                                          
2 A list of the party platforms mentioned below is provided in the appendix. 
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Under the new leadership of Matteo Salvini, the party has sought to become an Italian 
version of the French Front National and has started to campaign in regions in which it was 
not traditionally strong. The new strategy of territorial expansion is reflected in the party’s 
electoral campaign, which was totally dominated by the party leader and mainly focused on 
national issues and on the opposition to the central government (and to the European 
Union). Yet some differences can be noted in LN manifestos presented across the regions. In 
Veneto, an old stronghold of the League, the traditional themes of autonomy, federalism 
and even regional independence, were clearly mentioned in the party programme. On the 
other hand, in Tuscany, the party adopted a different programmatic strategy, which 
completely ignored the issues of regionalism and federalism but, instead, focused on 
national (or even supra-national) issues, such as the economic crisis, immigration and law 
and order.  
The mainstream, centre-right party led by Silvio Berlusconi – renamed ‘Italy 
Forward’ (Forza Italia, FI) in 2014– did not adopt a clear political platform in the 2015 
election. In some regions, like Liguria, a traditional manifesto was not even presented. In 
Umbria, the party passively accepted the programmatic points suggested by an 
‘independent’ candidate. In general, the absence of a clear national strategy, swinging from 
supporting to opposing the Renzi government, was also reflected in the lack of strong 
electoral messages during the electoral campaign. 
Finally, the Five Star Movement (M5S),  an ‘anti-system’ political force that obtained 
a very strong result in the 2013 general election, focused its campaign on issues such  
transparency in public institutions, environmentalism and the creation of a ‘basic income’ 
across the whole Italian territory. Yet some ‘formal’ differences can be noted in the 
programmes presented at the regional level. Whereas in Liguria the M5S candidate 
presented a very extensive and detailed programme, in Apulia the manifesto was very brief 
and vague, basically a series of power point slides. It should also be underlined that, unlinke 
in the previous elections, the national leader of the M5S, the comedian Beppe Grillo, did not 
play an active role in the election campaign, which was mainly led by young regional 
candidates together with a group of national representatives of the Movement. 
The last electoral round demonstrates the increasing fragmentation of coalition 
strategies pursued by political parties in the regional arena. Italy may be seen as an 
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exception in the European context, since the electoral systems adopted by its regions 
encourage the formation of coalitions before (and not after) the elections. Table 2 shows how 
competition has changed across the seven regions from 2005 until the last election. If in 2005 
competition was mainly between broad, centre-left and centre-right coalitions, today the 
picture is much more fragmented. For instance, far left parties are no longer part of centre-
left coalitions (dominated by the PD) in most of the regions, whereas centre-right parties 
have formed comprehensive coalitions (including LN, FI and smaller parties) only in 
Liguria, Umbria and Campania. Additionally, centre parties have established alliances with 
different coalitions depending on the regional context. Finally, the emergence of the Five 
Star Movement has further complicated the map of political competition in the Italian 
regions.  
[Table 2] 
 
The increasing weakness of the links between central and regional party 
organisations may be regarded as one of the main causes of the less consistent coalition and 
programmatic strategies pursued at the sub-national level. Italian statewide parties seem to 
have developed new ‘stratarchical’ organisational structures (Carty, 2004; Katz and Mair, 
2009). In this context, national leaders are still able (and willing) to control the selection of 
national representatives and define the national strategy of the party, whereas local and 
regional organisations are free to adopt different programmatic and coalition strategies 
depending on the regional context (Van Biezen and Hopkin, 2006). 
Electoral competition in Italian regions is no longer ‘monopolised’ by political 
parties, since new ‘local lists’ have emerged and multiplied in recent years. Even though 
such lists have been studied mainly in municipal electoral contexts (Reise and Holtmann, 
2008), the Italian case seems to suggest that they may also play an important role at the 
‘meso-level’. Local lists are different from political parties, even from regionalist parties, 
because they do not rely on any kind of integrated organisation and formal membership. 
They participate exclusively in electoral competitions to select the council and president of 
one specific region (i.e. they are not cross-territorial organisations and they do not compete 
in general elections). Additionally, they often refer to the name of a specific candidate 
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(personal lists) and, although they might form coalitions with political parties, they reject 
identifiable partisan labels (often they call themselves ‘civic lists’, to underline their nature 
as bottom-up networks of ‘free citizens’).  
The number of local lists participating in regional elections has increased 
substantially in the last election, as shown in Table 3. Even compared to the 2010 election, 
the number of non-partisan lists presented in the 2015 regional elections has more than 
doubled, from 15 to 38. Therefore, it seems that Italian parties are losing their appeal in the 
regional arena and, in order to maintain their support, often ‘outsource’ representation to 
lists that are not formally recognizable as ‘partisan’. Indeed, Pritoni (2014: 390) has argued 
that mainstream Italian parties often choose to promote local lists as part of a ‘blame 
avoidance’ strategy aimed at attracting the votes of those citizens, who are increasingly 
sceptical of purely party-based politics. Veneto and Campania are the two regions where 
this phenomenon has been more noticeable.  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
 
The crisis of legitimacy of regional governments 
 
The last contextual factor that should be taken into account when analysing regional 
election results in Italy, is the crisis of political legitimacy faced by regional institutions.  A 
Demos survey published at the end of 20143 shows that since 2010, Italians’ support for 
regional institutions has dropped from 33% to 19%, a decline of 14 percentage points that is 
even greater than in the case of municipalities (-12%) and national parliament (-6%). 
The whole political system of Italy has experienced years of turbulence and 
instability since the beginning of the economic crisis in the late 2000s. Yet regions seem to 
have been particularly hit by the wave of protest politics. This is also due to the various 
corruption or expenses scandals that have involved regional governments and councils in 
the last years (Cerruto, 2013). Additionally, the 2015 electoral campaign was characterised 
                                                          
3 http://www.demos.it/a01077.php (date of access 27/06/2015) 
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by a heated debate on regional candidates that were involved in judicial proceedings (the so-
called impresentabili, “unpresentable candidates”). In sum, regions have come to be seen as 
clear examples of corrupted political elites and diffuse misgovernment. 
 
 
 
Part 2 
The collapse in political participation 
 
Aggregate turnout in the seven regions has reached the lowest point in the last election. 
Table 4 shows that, since 1990, turnout has collapsed from 86.4% to 52.3%. Even compared 
to the previous electoral round, turnout in 2015 has dropped by 11 percentage points. 
Interestingly, the largest decline in turnout has been experienced in Tuscany and Marche, 
two regions that used to lead the ranking of political participation in Italy and now have 
turnouts below 50%. Thus, changes in Italian sub-national democracy have been quite 
radical and have overturned well-established traditions. Studies focusing on the 
transformation of advanced representative democracies (see, for instance, Mair 2005) have 
pointed to a trend of decreasing electoral participation in national elections. In the Italian 
case such trend seems even more accentuated at the regional level (participation in national 
elections has ‘only’ declined from 87% in 1992 to 75% in 2013). 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
 
The declining appeal of political parties 
At first sight, the overall result of this election was not different from that in 2010: centre-left 
coalitions led by the Democratic Party won in five out of seven regions. Whereas ruling 
coalitions did not change in 4 regions, Campania shifted from the centre-right to the centre-
left and Liguria experienced an opposite swing. Yet if we look at the results obtained by 
individual parties we immediately notice that, compared to the previous election, the 
political landscape in the seven regions has been radically transformed.  
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As shown in Table 5, only two parties have not experienced a significant change in 
their overall support. The Democratic Party (PD), has confirmed its 2010 result (around 
25%), increasing its vote share in Tuscany and Marche, while experiencing small losses in 
the other five regions. Also the Northern League (LN) has achieved an aggregate result that 
is very similar to that of 2010, although it has become substantially stronger in central Italian 
regions such as Tuscany, Umbria and Marche, whereas in Veneto it seems to have lost many 
votes to local lists (although the strongest local list in Veneto is the ‘personal’ list of the LN 
candidate for president).  
The real loser of the election is the mainstream, centre-right party Forward Italy (FI). 
Whereas this party was the strongest one in 2010, today it has collapsed to around one third 
of its original vote share, with a more marked decline in central-northern regions. Today the 
leadership of the centre-right coalition is increasingly challenged by the Northern League, 
which, as shown by the election results, has ceased to be a regionalist political force, mainly 
based in the North, and has managed to expand its electoral support to the Centre and even 
the South of Italy (indeed, for the first time, the party achieved a 2.4% in Apulia). 
Lastly, the Five Star Movement (M5S) achieved a respectable 15% across the seven 
regions, scoring its best results in Liguria and Marche. The Movement has thus consolidated 
its role as second political force in the Italian political system (a role that it already achieved 
in 2013 and 2014).  
However, the most notable result in the last electoral round is the strengthening of 
local, ‘non-partisan’ lists. As already underlined, the number of lists that cannot be directly 
identified as political parties (although they can still establish alliances with statewide and 
regionalist parties) has substantially increased over the last 25 years. Yet it seems that in the 
last election, their aggregate electoral score has risen even more significantly, from 7.6% in 
2010 to almost 20%. Going back to 1990, it can be noted that the 2015 election is a ‘critical 
juncture’ in the crisis of partisan politics at the regional level (Figure 1). From the early 1990s 
until 2010, the increase in electoral support for local lists was gradual and, in any case, did 
not seem to challenge the predominance of partisan political actors. With the 2015 election, 
instead, local lists have come to control almost one fifth of the vote in the seven regions and 
this should be seen as a clear sign of declining electoral appeal of organised political parties 
in the regional arena.   
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[Table 5 about here] 
 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
 
 
In sum, the political landscape of Italian regions seems to have changed quite radically. This 
is further confirmed by the magnitude of electoral volatility, calculated by using the 
Pedersen index (see Bartolini and Mair, 1990) ranging from 0 (no volatility) to 100 (full 
volatility). In Table 6, 2015 is compared to 2010 but also to 1995, when levels of volatility 
were the highest in the history of Italian regionalism due to the collapse of the old party 
system in the early 1990s. We can see that volatility in 2015 is much closer to that of the 
‘earthquake’ election in 1995 than to those of the more ‘ordinary’ election in 2010. 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
Representation in the seven regions 
 
Table 7 provides an overview of the regional councils elected in 2015. First of all it considers 
the share of seats won by the main forces participating in the elections. The PD is by far the 
largest party across the seven regional councils obtaining around 35% of the seats, thus 
increasing its representation compared to 2010. FI and the LN have obtained similar shares 
of seats, around 10%, but, overall, they are both behind the M5S, which, therefore, is the 
second party also in terms of representation. It should also be noted that whereas the LN has 
increased its representation, particularly in Liguria and in central regions such as Tuscany, 
Umbria and Marche, FI has experienced a dramatic collapse. The composition of regional 
councils seems to indicate the existence of a ‘dominant’ party on the centre-left (the PD) and 
of a rather fragmented opposition, in which no party emerges as the leading one. 
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Additionally, the declining representation of other, small or medium-sized, parties (-10%) 
seems to have been counterbalanced by a general strengthening of local lists (+11.3%). 
Finally, the nature of party systems resulting from the interaction between real votes 
and electoral formulas is considered. As already shown, regions adopted different voting 
systems and this may have led to increasing cross-regional divergence in the types of 
electoral democracy. This seems to be confirmed by some preliminary results shown in 
Table 7. First, one can consider the level of party fragmentation within the newly elected 
councils (that is, the ‘effective’ number of parties or lists that obtained representation), which 
is measured by using the Laakso Taagepera (1979) index. Secondly, the ‘disproportionality’ 
between votes and seats may be assessed by using the Gallagher (1991) index (least squares 
index): the higher the value, the higher the discrepancy between votes and seats. Whereas 
regions such as Tuscany, Umbria and Marche have moved towards less fragmented and 
more disproportional systems of representation, thus developing more ‘majoritarian’ 
characteristics (Lijphart, 1999), Veneto and Liguria have moved in the opposite direction, 
since they now have more fragmented and proportional systems than in 2010. In between, 
we find the cases of Campania and Apulia, where a substantial increase in fragmentation is 
accompanied by an increase in disproportionality (although this increase is minimal in the 
case of Apulia). The picture is therefore extremely heterogeneous and it is not possible to 
detect a clear pattern of development across the seven regions. 
 
[Table 7 about here] 
Conclusion 
This paper has sought to provide an analysis of the recent election results in seven Italian 
regions. The context of the 2015 regional election has been thoroughly investigated: the 
elections were affected by differentiation in regional electoral systems, the strategies 
pursued by political parties, and the crisis of legitimacy of regional institutions. The analysis 
of the election outcomes can be summarised in three points. First of all, electoral 
participation has significantly dropped. Secondly, statewide parties have been increasingly 
challenged by non-partisan, local lists; the levels of electoral volatility have been 
exceptionally high. Finally, regional party systems seem to be following diverging 
12 
 
trajectories of development. It means that regional party-based democracy in Italy appears 
to be experiencing increasing fragmentation. 
 
 
Appendix: list of party manifestos mentioned in this study (by party) 
PD/ Centre-Left: 
Veneto: http://www.alessandramoretti.it/programma/ 
Tuscany: http://www.pdtoscana.it/wp-content/uploads/PROGRAMMA-REGIONALI-
20151.pdf 
Apulia: http://www.micheleemiliano.it/ 
 
Northern League: 
Veneto: http://lucazaia.it 
Tuscany: http://naz-toscana.leganord.org/programma_leganord_elezioni_regionali_2015.pdf 
 
FI/Centre-right 
Liguria: manifesto not found 
Umbria: http://www.riccipresidente.it/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/RICCI_Programma_x-
web.pdf 
5 Star Movement: 
Liguria: http://www.alicesalvatore.it/stella-1-sviluppo-economico/ 
Apulia: http://www.antonellalaricchia.it/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Programma-
Regionali-2015-rev.-6.pdf 
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Table 1. Voting systems in the seven regions involved in the 2015 election round 
 Number 
of seats 
Thresholds  Majority Bonus 
Veneto 50(+1*) 3% for party in a coalition 
obtaining at least 10%. 
Otherwise 5%. 
30 seats (out of 50) if coalition obtains 
50% of the vote 
29 seats if winning coalition obtains 
between 40 and 50% of votes 
28 of seats if winning coalition obtains 
less than 40% of seats 
Liguria 30(+1) No threshold for party if 
candidate for president 
obtains at least 5%. 
Otherwise 3 %.  
Winning coalition obtains 6 extra seats 
(blocked list) 
Tuscany  40(+1) 3% for party in a coalition 
obtaining 10%. Otherwise 
5%. 
24 seats (out of 40) if winning coalition 
obtains more than 45% of the vote 
23 seats if winning coalition obtains less 
than 45% of the vote 
Second round if no candidate for 
president obtains 40% of the vote 
Umbria 20(+1) 2.5% for any party Winning coalition always obtains 12 
out of 20 seats 
Marche 30(+1) No threshold for party in 
a coalition obtaining 5%. 
Otherwise 3%. 
18 seats (out of 30) if winning coalition 
obtains at least 40% of the vote 
17 seats if winning coalition obtains 
between 37 and 40% of the vote 
16 seats if winning coalition obtains 
between 34 and 37% of the vote 
Campania 50(+1) No threshold for party if 
candidate for president 
obtains at least 10%. 
Otherwise 3%. 
30 to 32 seats (out of 50) for the 
winning coalition 
Apulia 50(+1) 4% for party in a 
coalition. Otherwise 8%. 
 
29 seats (out of 50) if winning coalition 
obtains at least 40% of the vote 
28 seats if winning coalition obtains 
between 35 and 40% of the vote 
27 seats if winning coalition obtains less 
than 35% of the vote 
*The elected regional president is also a member of the regional council. 
Sources: Websites of regional governments (http://www.regione.liguria.it/; http://www.regione.veneto.it; 
http://www.regione.toscana.it/; http://www.regione.umbria.it; http://www.regione.campania.it/; 
http://www.regione.puglia.it/) and cise.luiss.it  
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Table 2. Main coalitions participating in regional elections from 2005 to 2010 
 
 2005 2010 2015 
Liguria  Centre-
left 
Centre-
right 
  Centre-
Left + 
Centre 
 Centre-
right  
 Left+ Part 
of Centre-
Left 
Centre-
Left 
 Centre-
right + 
Centre 
 M5S 
Veneto  Centre-
left 
Centre-
right 
Local  Centre-
Left  
Centre Centre-
right  
M5S  Centre-
Left 
Centre+ 
Part of 
Centre-
Right 
Centre-
right 
 M5S 
Tuscany Left Centre-
left 
Centre-
right 
  Centre-
Left  
Centre Centre-
right 
 Left Centre-left Centre Centre-
right 
Right M5S 
Umbria  Centre-
left 
Centre-
right 
  Centre-
Left  
Centre Centre-
right  
  Centre-
Left  
 Centre-
right+ 
Centre 
 M5S 
Marche  Centre-
left 
Centre-
right 
 Left Centre-
Left + 
Centre 
 Centre-
right  
 Left Centre-
Left + Part 
of Centre 
 Centre-
right+ Part 
of Centre 
Right M5S 
Campania  Centre-
left 
Centre-
right 
 Left  Centre-
Left  
 Centre-
right + 
Centre 
M5S Left  Centre-
Left+ Part 
of Centre 
 Centre-
right + Part 
of Centre 
 M5S 
Apulia  Centre-
left 
Centre-
right 
  Centre-
Left  
Centre Centre-
right  
  Centre-
Left 
Part of 
Centre-
right 
Part of 
Centre-
Right 
 M5S 
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on data provided by Italian Interior Ministry (www.interno.it).
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Table 3. Local lists participating in regional elections from 1990 to 2015 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Liguria 0 3 1 3 3 5 
Veneto 0 1 3 4 4 11 
Tuscany 1 0 1 0 0 3 
Umbria 0 1 0 0 0 5 
Marche 1 0 1 1 2 2 
Campania 1 1 2 3 2 8 
Apulia 0 1 1 3 4 4 
Total 3 7 9 14 15 38 
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on data provided by Italian Interior Ministry (www.interno.it). 
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Table 4. Declining turnout in Italian regions 1990–2015  
 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 Difference 
2015/2010 
Difference 
2015/1990 
Liguria 84.8 80 70.4 69.6 60.9 50.7 -10.2 -34.1 
Veneto 90.8 85.2 75.6 72.4 66.4 57.2 -9.2 -33.6 
Tuscany 89.6 85.2 74.6 71.4 60.7 48.8 -11.9 -40.8 
Umbria 90.6 85.6 76.8 74.3 65.4 55.4 -10 -35.2 
Marche 89.4 84.6 74.3 71.5 62.8 49.8 -13 -39.6 
Campania 81.1 73.9 69.5 67.7 63 51.9 -11.1 -29.2 
Apulia 84.2 75.7 70.2 70.5 63.2 51.2 -12 -33 
Total 86.4 80.1 72.4 70.4 63.3 52.3 -11 -34.1 
Source: Italian Interior Ministry (www.interno.it). Author’s own elaboration.  
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Table 5. Election results by party and winning coalitions (in the last column). Difference with previous election in brackets.  
 Democratic 
Party (PD) 
Forward 
Italy (FI) 
Northern 
League (LN) 
Five Star 
Mov.  (M5S) 
Other parties 
 
Local lists 
 
Winning coalition 
 
Liguria 25.6 
(-2.7) 
12.7 
(-16.6) 
20.3 
(+10.1) 
22.3 
(+22.3) 
10.4 
(-10.3) 
8.8 
(-1.7) 
Centre-right: FI, LN, 
others  
(Centre-left) 
Veneto 16.7 
(-4.3) 
6 
(-18.7) 
17.8 
(-17.4) 
10.4 
(+7.8) 
6.6 
(-8.4) 
42.6 
(+40.4) 
Centre-right: LN, FI, 
others 
(Centre-right) 
Tuscany 46.3 
(+4.1) 
8.5 
(-18.6) 
16.2 
(+9.7) 
15.1 
(+15.1) 
11.6 
(-11.7) 
2.3 
(+1.4) 
Centre-left: PD 
(Centre-left) 
Umbria 35.8 
(-0.4) 
8.5 
(-23.9) 
14 
(+9.7) 
14.6 
(+14.6) 
18.5 
(-8.6) 
8.6 
(+8.6) 
Centre-left: PD, Left, 
others 
(Centre-left) 
Marche 35.1 
(+4) 
9.4 
(-21.8) 
13 
(+6.7) 
18.9 
(+18.9) 
18.5 
(-7.9) 
5 
(+0.1) 
Centre-left: PD, 
others 
(Centre-left) 
Campania 19.5 
(-1.9) 
17.8 
(-13.9) 
0 
(=) 
17 
(+15.7) 
24 
(-6) 
21.6 
(+14.1) 
Centre-left: PD, 
others 
(Centre-right) 
Apulia 19.8 
(-1) 
11.4 
(-19.7) 
2.4 
(+2.4) 
17.2 
(+17.2) 
34.3 
(+6.5) 
15 
(-5.3) 
Centre-left: PD, Left, 
others 
(Centre-left) 
Total 25.2 
(-0.7) 
11.3 
(-18.9) 
9.6 
(-0.3) 
15.7 
(+14.8) 
18.7 
(-7.8) 
19.6 
(+12) 
Centre-left: 5 regions 
Centre-right: 2 
regions 
 
Source: Source: Italian Interior Ministry (www.iterno.it). Author’s own elaboration.  
19 
 
Table 6. Volatility in 1995, 2010 and 2015 
 1995 2010 2015 
Liguria 51.2 20 48 
Veneto 61.1 30 57.3 
Tuscany 43.2 18.9 36 
Umbria 52.8 23 42.8 
Marche 54.5 22.4 50 
Campania 65.1 37.9 43.4 
Apulia 62.1 32.2 55.4 
Average 55.7 26.3 47.6 
Source: Source: Italian Interior Ministry (www.interno.it). Author’s own elaboration.  
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Table 7. Regional representation by party (% of seats), fragmentation and disproportionality in newly elected councils (difference 
with previous election in brackets) 
 Share of seats won %  Fragmentation 
(Laakso Taagepera 
index) 
Disproportionality 
(Gallagher index) 
 Democratic 
Party (PD) 
Forward 
Italy (FI) 
Northern 
League (LN) 
Five Star 
Movement (M5S) 
Local Lists Other 
Parties 
  
Liguria 25.8 
(-10.8) 
19.4 
(-7.5) 
22.6 
(+15.3) 
19.4 
(+19.4) 
0 
(-7.3) 
12.9 
(-9.1) 
5  
(+0.6) 
6.9  
(-0.3) 
Veneto 17.6 
(-7.9) 
5.9 
(-22) 
21.6 
(-12.9) 
9.8 
(+9.8) 
43.1 
(+41.5) 
2 
(-9.5) 
6.1 
(+2.3) 
4 
(-0.8) 
Tuscany 61 
(+15.5) 
4.9 
(-26) 
14.6 
(+9.2) 
12.2 
(+12.2) 
0 
(=) 
7.3 
(-10.9) 
2.4 
(-0.7) 
11.2 
(+6.6) 
Umbria 52.4 
(+4) 
4.8 
(-21) 
9.5 
(+6.3) 
9.5 
(+9.5) 
9.5 
(+9.5) 
14.3 
(-8.3) 
3.2 
(=) 
13.9 
(+3.5) 
Marche 51.6 
(+15.2) 
6.5 
(-23.1) 
9.7 
(+5.1) 
16.1 
(+16.1) 
6.5 
(+4.2) 
9.7 
(-17.6) 
3.2 
(-1) 
12.7 
(+8.3) 
Campania 31.4 
(+8.4) 
15.7 
(-20.4) 
0 
(=) 
13.7 
(+13.7) 
21.6 
(+11.8) 
17.6 
(-13.5) 
6.3 
(+1.5) 
10.3 
(+5.5) 
Apulia 27.5 
(+0.2) 
11.8 
(-18.2) 
0 
(=) 
13.7 
(+13.7) 
17.6 
(+1.9) 
29.4 
(+2.3) 
6.8 
(+2.9) 
7 
(+0.2) 
Total 35.7 
(+2.9) 
10.1 
(-19.9) 
10.5 
(+2.3) 
13.5 
(+13.5) 
16.6 
(+11.3) 
13.7 
(-10) 
--- --- 
Source: Source: Italian Interior Ministry (www.iterno.it). Author’s own elaboration.  
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Figure 1. Overall support for local lists in the seven regions (1990–2015) 
 
Source: Italian Interior Ministry. Author’s own elaboration.  
 
